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SHOULD RACE MATTER?: UNUSUAL ANSWERS 
TO THE USUAL QUESTIONS. By David Boonin.1 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. vii + 
441. $99.00 (cloth), $34.99 (paper). 
Larry Alexander2 & Maimon Schwarzschild3 
One frequently hears that America has a race problem. We 
agree, but the race problem we identify is not what is usually 
meant by those who invoke it. It is not discrimination, 
intentional or otherwise, but rather obsession with race that is 
America’s more consequential “race problem” today. America 
has vanquished slavery, segregation, and long-standing racial 
discrimination only to succumb to an almost equally destructive 
race obsession. Despite the biological arbitrariness of dividing a 
single, interbreeding biological species into “races,” despite the 
sorry history legally and socially of the use of race, and despite 
the Civil Rights Movement’s original ambition to substitute the 
content of character for the color of skin as the basis of decision 
making, America today is in many ways as race conscious as it 
was in the era of Jim Crow. 
For that reason we welcome David Boonin’s Should Race 
Matter? Boonin takes up five topics that constitute a good 
portion of the current obsession—reparations, affirmative 
action, hate speech, hate crimes, and profiling—and he subjects 
each to philosophical scrutiny. Boonin is sober and fair-minded 
in tone, and purports to be careful and comprehensive in 
method. Unlike many discussions of race, Boonin’s tries to shed 
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light, not heat. He deserves to be read by everyone who takes a 
serious interest in public policy as it bears on race. 
Boonin’s book has its limitations, as we will suggest. 
Moreover, Boonin discusses only race, not sex, ethnicity, 
nationality, religion, disability, or sexual preference, although 
most of the policies he considers have been urged or actually 
extended beyond race to some or all of these other categories. 
Nonetheless, Boonin’s analyses of these policies as they bear on 
race would have direct implications for these other categories. 
Given that Boonin takes 350 pages to examine five racial 
policies, we think limiting his focus to race was quite justifiable. 
Although we believe Boonin’s is a worthwhile treatment of 
contemporary racial policies, we take issue with him on several 
points. We think that his arguments in support of affirmative 
action and hate crimes are incomplete and thus unpersuasive, 
and we consider his case for reparations a failure on its own 
terms. Nonetheless, we admire the effort at fair-mindedness and 
the care with which he makes the case for these policies. 
I. HATE SPEECH 
We begin with the topic on which Boonin and we are in full 
agreement: hate speech. Boonin is opposed to bans on racial 
“hate speech” because he believes such bans can only be 
justified by repudiating current free speech doctrines that we 
would and should be loath to reject. In his exemplary two-
chapter discussion of the issue, he canvasses the major rationales 
that are offered to support bans on racial hate speech and finds 
them all wanting. In the first chapter on this subject (Chapter 
Six), Boonin analyzes arguments that try to assimilate racial hate 
speech to categories of expression that are already deemed 
unprotected speech by today’s constitutional free speech 
doctrines. Not all racial hate speech is a true threat; and true 
threats are already prohibited (pp. 210–13). Not every instance 
of racial hate speech constitutes “fighting words,” which are 
insults rendered face to face and likely to provoke a violent 
response (pp. 216-17).4 Racial hate speech cannot be assimilated 
to the libel of some corporate entity (pp. 217–25), nor is every 
instance of it a case of actionable harassment (pp. 226–29). In 
 
 4. Boonin also expresses reservations about the moral case for banning fighting 
words: the rationale for banning fighting words extends to legitimate commentary on 
public policy, and it unjustifiably places the responsibility for altercation on the speaker 
rather than his audience (pp. 213–16). 
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sum, a broad ban on racial hate speech could not be justified 
under current free speech doctrines. 
In Chapter Seven, Boonin then considers and rejects 
justifications for banning racial hate speech as such, rather than 
as instances of other categories of legally unprotected 
expression. “Words that wound” is a justification that sweeps in 
far too much expression that a free society would want to protect 
(pp. 230–36). Nor can hate speech be properly construed as a 
“subordinating speech act” (pp. 236–41): either the speaker lacks 
the authority required to subordinate, or the notion of authority 
has to be expanded to the point where speech that almost 
everyone would want to protect would be deemed sub-
ordinating. Finally, hate speech cannot be banned on the ground 
that it “silences” without again sweeping in lots of quite 
legitimate speech (pp. 241–45). 
At the conclusion of Chapter Seven, Boonin asks whether 
the fact, if it is so, that hate speech wounds, subordinates, and 
silences makes a case for banning it even though each of those 
harms, individually, would not do so (pp. 245–48). He compares 
a white student’s calling a black student a “nigger” in the 
presence of other students with a Catholic student’s publicly 
calling another Catholic student a “dangerous heretic” for 
supporting abortion and gay rights. He concludes that if the first 
student’s speech wounds, subordinates, and silences, the second 
student’s can do so as well. If the second student’s speech should 
be protected—and Boonin believes that it surely should be—
then so, too, should the first student’s. The “combination” of 
harms justification for hate speech bans fails. 
Depending on the circumstances, the first student’s speech 
might be banned as “fighting words” under well-established 
constitutional law. But in principle, we are in agreement with 
Boonin on the issue of hate speech. Arguments for hate speech 
bans consist of some normative premise (speech with 
characteristic X should not be protected as free speech) and a 
factual premise (racial hate speech has characteristic X). In 
Chapter Six Boonin takes on arguments in which the factual 
premise fails to hold. In Chapter Seven he takes on arguments in 
which the normative premise fails. Although racial hate speech is 
ugly and regrettable, so too is much other speech. The power to 
cleanse public dialogue of ugly and hurtful speech is a dangerous 
power that, for reasons Boonin adumbrates, would likely be 
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used either selectively in a divisive, partisan way, or much too 
broadly.5 
II. RACIAL PROFILING 
In the final two chapters of the book, Boonin examines the 
vexed topic of racial profiling. In the book’s penultimate chapter 
he asks whether racial profiling is rational, and he concludes that 
it can be. In the final chapter he asks whether racial profiling, 
even if rational, is nonetheless immoral, and he concludes that it 
is not. With some qualifications regarding the moral question, 
we believe Boonin is essentially correct in both chapters. 
In thinking about the rationality of racial profiling, it is 
useful to be clear about what profiling is.6 When we profile or 
stereotype—these are essentially synonymous—we use a given 
trait that is relatively easy to identify as a proxy for the trait in 
which we are ultimately interested. The relation between the 
proxy trait and the target trait is a probabilistic one. The 
existence of the proxy trait makes it more likely that the person 
who possesses it has the target trait than a person picked at 
random. The rationality of using a given proxy trait depends 
upon its correlation with the target trait and the relative costs 
and benefits of using a different proxy or a more refined proxy 
that has a higher correlation with the target trait. But there is no 
question but that using proxy traits to predict target traits is 
 
 5. It is a shame that Boonin wrote his book prior to the publication of Jeremy 
Waldron’s book on hate speech, a book that has already received considerable scholarly 
attention. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012); see also Brian 
Leiter, Book Review (reviewing WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH), Notre Dame 
Philosophical Reviews, http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/32077-the-harm-in-hate-speech/ (2012)). 
Waldron supports bans on written but not oral hate speech. The principal harm that 
Waldron believes supports such a ban is not the offense or hurt felt by its targets, 
whether from the mere presence of the written words or, more realistically, from the 
knowledge that there are some among one’s fellow citizens who hold the views 
expressed. Rather, the real harm is the insecurity regarding one’s status in society caused 
by the fear that the visible expression of such views might persuade others to hold them 
as well. 
Although we can only guess at how Boonin would respond to Waldron’s argument, 
he would probably argue that we do and should protect “illiberal speech,” speech that 
takes issue with the fundamental values of liberal society, including equality. Of course, 
free speech extended to protect illiberal ideas exposes an oft-noted paradox: free speech 
protects speech that rejects the normative basis of free speech. For an argument against 
free speech protection for some illiberal speech, see Carl. A. Auerbach, The Communist 
Control Acts of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 173 (1956). On the paradox more generally, see LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A 
RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 147–81 (2005). 
 6. An excellent treatment of this topic is found in FREDERICK SCHAUER, 
PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES (2003). 
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rational. Indeed, we must do it, for we must act on the basis of 
imperfect information about others all the time. It is not only 
insurance companies predicting our life expectancy, our health, 
or our traffic accidents, or political pollsters predicting our likely 
votes, or sociologists predicting behavior more generally who 
must rely on proxies. All of us do, all the time. It is inconceivable 
that we could dispense with proxies, so the rationality of their 
use is beyond question. 
That still leaves open the question of whether the use of 
race as a proxy is ever rational. Race is, after all, an imprecise 
characteristic, and its use will require some arbitrary judgments. 
Nonetheless, despite the arbitrary boundaries of the proxy, in 
some contexts its use can be quite rational. If one is testing for 
sickle cell anemia, it makes sense to focus on persons who 
appear to be descended from the pre-colonial peoples of sub-
Saharan Africa, just as if one is testing for Tay-Sachs, it makes 
sense to focus on Ashkenazi Jews. And even those who purport 
to object to racial profiling probably take greater precautions for 
their personal safety when in some neighborhoods rather than 
others, with the racial or ethnic composition of the neighbor-
hood serving as their proxy for relative dangerousness. 
Of course, if there are more predictive proxies available at a 
low enough cost to obtain—or if, again at a cost-benefit justified 
cost to obtain, there are ways to refine the proxy by combining it 
with other traits—then race will cease to be the most rational 
proxy for its purpose. A neighborhood’s ethnic makeup might be 
less predictive of danger than its wealth or poverty. Or its 
economics combined with its racial makeup may be more 
predictive than either proxy by itself. 
Boonin’s focus is on a paradigmatic use of racial profiling: 
the decision by the police to stop, among drivers who are 
violating traffic laws, a disproportionate number of black 
offenders on the ground that they are more likely than the 
average offender to be committing drug or weapons offenses. If 
it is true that they are more likely than average to be committing 
these offenses, and given the finite resources of the police, then 
Boonin concludes that this type of racial profiling is rational. 
Boonin first considers some arguments that contest the 
claim that black drivers are more likely to be committing drug or 
weapons offenses, and he finds them to be unsound (pp. 308–19). 
Boonin then considers some arguments against such profiling’s 
rationality that do not rest on the denial that black drivers are 
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more likely than others to be committing drug or weapons 
offenses. One such argument, the “elasticity” argument, posits 
that profiling blacks will lead to an increase in crime by whites, 
so that there will be no net decrease in crime or increase in the 
percentage of criminals caught offending (pp. 319–23). (This is 
why rational profilers, like El Al’s security agents, do not 
publicize the profiles they employ.) Another such argument is 
that racial profiling will not be implemented rationally and will 
be used when proxies more predictive than race or race alone 
are available (pp. 323–25). 
Boonin believes, and we agree, that the “elasticity” and 
“over use” objections are cogent and may render many instances 
of racial profiling irrational. Nonetheless, he concludes, 
correctly, that racial profiling can sometimes be rational (pp. 
325–26). 
Boonin’s last chapter examines racial profiling’s morality 
given its rationality. Boonin concludes that even though racial 
profiling burdens the proxy group—in this case, black drivers—
more than others, it is not for this reason immoral. Boonin 
points out that if racial profiling is rational, it will yield more 
arrests for serious offenses per drivers stopped than would 
random stops. It does so at the cost of disproportionately 
burdening black drivers, most of whom will be innocent. But that 
fact will not render the profiling immoral. 
Boonin’s defense of the morality of the disproportionate 
racial burden consists of an argument by analogy (pp. 342–47). 
He asks us to imagine a city that is 75% white and 25% black. 
He then imagines that there is a pipe leak that will require 
shutting down one or the other of two streets. On one street live 
100 people, 50 white and 50 black. On the other street live 120 
people, 90 white and 30 black. He argues that everyone would 
(and should) agree that it would be proper to shut down the less 
populated street, even though doing so will disproportionately 
burden blacks. Or, again in the same city, suppose there is an 
incident of rioting and looting, and two vans are fleeing the 
scene, one with three whites and one black, the other three 
whites and three blacks, and the police can only pursue one of 
the vans. Boonin asserts that everyone would (and should) agree 
that it would be proper to pursue the van with more looters in it, 
even if it includes a disproportionate number of blacks. 
In principle, we agree with Boonin about the morality of 
racial profiling. We think, however, that Boonin’s discussion of 
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its morality, as opposed to its rationality, is incomplete. First, 
Boonin should have distinguished the use of race to predict 
voluntary conduct from its use to predict some matter beyond 
voluntary control. People have a different reaction when they 
are disadvantaged by a prediction of their voluntary conduct 
from their reaction when they are disadvantaged by a prediction 
of some natural event over which they lack control. To tell a 
male that he is paying a higher life insurance premium than a 
comparable female because males do not live as long on average 
will elicit a shrug of the shoulders. To tell a female that she is not 
getting the job despite otherwise having credentials slightly 
better than her male competitor because women are on average 
much more likely to quit at an early age in order to have 
children will likely elicit outrage. “I can control whether I quit,” 
she will rightly say, “and if I say I won’t, I won’t.” The employer 
may respond that his statistics are predictive even for women 
who at the time they are hired insist they won’t quit. Yet that 
will not likely stanch the woman’s sense that she has been 
deemed “guilty by association” because of the conduct of other 
women, conduct that she feels confident she won’t emulate. 
Disadvantaging predictions based on sociological 
generalizations—i.e., profiles, stereotypes—have a different feel 
and elicit a different reaction from those based on the natural 
sciences, the truths of which are not hostage to our choices. This 
is not to deny that sociological predictions can be quite accurate. 
Political polling is now quite good at predicting election 
outcomes, and the National Safety Council is uncannily accurate 
in predicting traffic deaths on holiday weekends. 
Racial profiling is based on sociological generalizations, not 
natural scientific ones, which at least partly explains the negative 
reactions it provokes. This is not to deny its legitimacy in some 
situations, especially if, unlike the denial of a job, it results in 
only a temporary intrusion on the innocent. Nonetheless, we 
wish Boonin would have discussed this specific aspect of racial 
profiling in his discussion of its morality. For in the absence of 
that discussion, his case for its morality will seem to many to be 
incomplete.7 
 
 7. For a discussion of the use of sociological predictions in the context of 
antidiscrimination norms, see Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination 
Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 168–73 
(1992). 
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There is yet another aspect of the moral case for profiling 
that merits discussion. Finite resources will often require 
selectivity in investigating criminal or terrorist activity. The 
criteria for selection will mean that some innocents will be 
burdened and thus sacrificed to some degree for the benefit of 
everyone else. In this respect, it makes no difference whether the 
criteria for selectivity are racial, ethnic, religious, or even 
completely random.8 
Finally, racial profiling is often yoked to other practices that 
make profiling even more problematic than it would be in 
isolation. Boonin’s paradigm of racial profiling is the decision by 
the police to stop, among drivers who are violating traffic laws, a 
disproportionate number of black offenders on the ground that 
they are more likely than the average traffic offender to be 
committing drug or weapons offenses. But if the traffic laws “on 
the books” are almost never enforced as written, then the police 
already exercise essentially unlimited discretion about whom to 
stop, and indeed about whom to charge with a violation. Posted 
speed limits, at least in many states, are an example. This alone 
has corrosive implications for the idea of the rule of law. If 
virtually unbounded police discretion is linked to racial profiling, 
it is almost inevitable that disproportionately targeted groups 
will feel that they are the object of unjust racial discrimination in 
law enforcement.9 
In the abstract, we think the moral case for racial profiling 
might be no weaker than it is for random stops or interrogations. 
The historical baggage of racial discrimination and harassment 
makes many Americans especially wary of racial profiling, 
however, and understandably so. We favor a presumption 
against racial profiling, but a presumption which could be 
overridden for sufficient practical reasons, depending on the 
circumstances. We are also open to the idea that the moral case 
for investigatory intrusions, whether based on profiles or at 
 
 8. Ex post, those investigated will always have had a 100% chance of being 
investigated, even if they were selected based on drawing numbers from a hat. For 
example, assume ten numbers drawn from 100 numbers in a hat represent the traffic 
stops that will result in a search for drugs and weapons, or the specific passengers going 
through airport security who will be subjected to interrogation. It makes no difference 
whether those numbers are drawn at the time of the stops or were drawn hours, days, or 
years before. In either case, if, say, 23 is the number for a stop with a search, then driver 
or traveler 23 had a 100% chance of suffering the extra burden, whether he or anyone 
else knew that ahead of time. 
 9. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(2011) for exceptionally thoughtful, well-informed, and troubling reflections on this and 
related matters.  
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random, might be strengthened if those burdened and who are 
innocent of the activities that are the target were given a small 
token of gratitude for bearing a burden for the benefit of the 
public—perhaps a voucher of some kind depending on how 
intrusive or burdensome the investigation. Indeed, in Boonin’s 
example of a street closure, regardless of the racial makeup of 
the street closed, it would seem only fair for those on the streets 
left open to contribute something to those on the street that is 
closed. 
III. HATE CRIMES 
In contrast to his positions on hate speech and profiling, 
Boonin finds nothing problematic about hate crimes—ordinary 
crimes, the punishment for which is increased if committed 
because of race, sex, religion, and so forth. Although such hate 
crime enhancements may be morally justifiable, we do not 
believe Boonin’s arguments are sufficient to make that case. 
We begin with those points on which we agree with Boonin. 
We agree with him that, however drawn, the distinction between 
intention and motive is immaterial in assessing a criminal’s 
desert (pp. 258–73). Moreover, we agree that a criminal’s 
negative desert can be increased both by the harms he believes 
his act may cause and by his reasons for acting.10 
Boonin believes that hate crime enhancements are 
justifiable because hate crimes can both cause more harm and 
also reflect more culpable motivation than the underlying crime 
 
 10. Specifically, we believe criminal desert is a function of culpability, and 
culpability is a function of (1) the perceived risks of various harms and (2) the reasons for 
imposing those risks. With respect to (1), the greater the harm and the greater the 
perceived risk of its occurring, the greater the actor’s culpability. With respect to (2), a 
distinction should be made between justifying reasons and motivating reasons. Justifying 
reasons are facts the actor believes exist, discounted by his perception of their 
probability, that would justify his imposing the risk of harm he believes his act will 
impose. If those facts, discounted by their probability, justify the risk of harm, then the 
actor’s act is not culpable, even if he is not motivated by the justifying facts. If, for 
example, the actor believes turning the trolley will save the lives of five trapped workers 
but likely kill one trapped worker on the siding, his turning the trolley will be morally 
permissible and thus nonculpable even if he is not motivated by saving the five and is 
motivated only by his desire to kill the one. On the other hand, if his imposing the risk is 
not justifiable in light of the justifying facts he believes exist, then his motivating reasons 
can render it more or less culpable. A person who drives at high speed through a school 
zone will, in the absence of special circumstances, be acting culpably. But his culpability 
will be lower if he is merely impatient but hopes not to injure anyone than if he is 
speeding with the hope of injuring or killing children. On these points, see LARRY 
ALEXANDER , ET AL., CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 23–65 
(2009). 
!!!ALEXANDERSCHWARZSCHILD-291-RACEMATTERS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 8/9/2013 2:54 PM 
40 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:31 
 
itself (pp. 274–83). We find Boonin’s arguments in support of 
these claims unpersuasive. 
Hate crime laws can be of different types. One type focuses 
on the criterion by which the defendant chose his victim. Did he, 
for example, choose a black victim in whole or in part because 
he was black? Another type focuses not on the criterion of 
selection but on the underlying reason for the selection, such as a 
belief that blacks are not due equal concern, or a visceral dislike 
of blacks. 
Boonin focuses on the first type, the criterion of selection 
form of hate crime. He thinks that such a crime—say, a murder 
in which the victim was selected because he was black—can be 
more harmful than an “ordinary” murder because it can create 
greater fear (pp. 280–81). But on that criterion, is it true? 
Does a serial killer who kills only blacks cause more harm 
than a serial killer whose victims are chosen at random and are 
of all races? It is difficult to see why that would be the case. A 
serial killer on the loose whose victims could be anyone would 
presumably cause fear throughout the entire community, 
whereas one whose victims were only of one race would cause 
fear only in a racial sub-community. Moreover, a serial killer 
who targets groups with large populations—e.g., whites, or 
anyone regardless of race—might, by the logic of quantum of 
fear caused, be committing more serious crimes than one who 
targets smaller groups—e.g., blacks—or very small ones, such as 
the Roma. 
Most hate crime statutes, moreover, include sex as one of 
the enhancing categories. Does a heterosexual rapist, who rapes 
only women, cause more harm or create more fear than a 
bisexual rapist, who rapes both men and women? What would 
be the argument that he does? In practice, if sex is an enhancing 
category, virtually all rapes or sexual assaults could be 
categorized as “hate crimes.” It is far from clear that such an 
across-the-board enhancement of existing penalties would really 
be desirable on this basis. 
Of course, pointing out the implications of hate crime 
enhancements based on the quantum of fear caused is not to 
deny that secondary harms, such as fear, that the defendant 
realizes he might be causing, might affect the level of his 
culpability. But it does suggest that if fear is their rationale, hate 
crime statutes are woefully underinclusive. Suppose there are 
more blondes or more lawyers than there are members of some 
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racial groups. A killer who targets blondes or lawyers will 
presumably then be worse than a killer who targets, say, Roma. 
But hate crime statutes do not make victims’ hair color or 
occupation a basis for punishment enhancement. 
The amount of harm risked is but one part of the culpability 
calculus. The other is the reason for which the actor imposes that 
risk—his motive for doing so. As we said, we agree with Boonin 
that there is no relevant distinction to be drawn in terms of 
culpability between the actor’s intention and his motive. We also 
believe, with Boonin, that motivating reasons affect culpability. 
The killer who kills out of hatred for the victim and the killer 
who kills out of mercy for the victim both intentionally kill their 
victims, but the former is surely more culpable than the latter. 
Finally, we agree with Boonin in rejecting Heidi Hurd’s 
argument that basing punishment on motives punishes character, 
which is not under one’s voluntary control, rather than choice 
(pp. 284–87). As Boonin quite rightly responds, although we 
cannot, at the time of action, choose the reasons for which we 
act, we can nevertheless choose whether, given those reasons, we 
act or refrain from acting. Punishment based on the defendant’s 
reasons is not punishment for an involuntary status. 
So we are with Boonin to this point with respect to the 
legitimacy of varying punishment based on the defendant’s 
reasons for acting. The question for the hate crime proponent, 
however, is whether killing because of racial animosity is really 
worse than the myriad other reasons that might motivate a killer. 
How about killing people because they are ugly or stupid? How 
about killings based on thoroughgoing misanthropy? We can 
think of all sorts of reasons for committing crimes that might be 
as bad as or even worse than racial animosity or those other 
specific forms of animosity that hate crime statutes pick out. 
Boonin acknowledges the underinclusiveness charge. His 
response to it is that “[w]hat matters is that a crime committed 
from a racially biased mental state is a worse crime than one that 
isn’t but that resembles the first crime in all other respects” (p. 
282, emphasis added). The problem, however, is that when we 
remove the racially biased mental state, we have to substitute for 
it some other reason why the defendant committed the crime. 
We cannot just compare the hate crime to an objectively similar 
crime committed for no reason whatsoever. Every crime will be 
motivated by some reason. Some will be less heinous than racial 
bias, others might be more heinous. The latter “resemble” the 
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hate crime as much as the former. The underinclusiveness charge 
still stands. 
Indeed, whether harm-based or motive-based, the 
categories covered by hate crimes seem quite underinclusive. 
One might therefore conclude that hate crime laws are better 
explained by political pressures than by careful consideration of 
which crimes are the most harmful or which reasons are the most 
heinous. Boonin’s treatment of hate crimes is good insofar as he 
refutes some bad arguments against hate crimes. However, his 
arguments are inadequate to persuade anyone wary of enhanced 
prosecution and punishment that might depend on the political 
clout of the group to which the victim belongs. 
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Boonin argues that racial preferences in education and 
employment are neither morally required (Chapter Three) nor 
morally forbidden (Chapter Four). We are convinced of the 
former but find Boonin’s defense of the latter deficient in two 
major respects. 
Boonin defends the permissibility of racial preferences 
essentially by contesting the notion that there is some morally 
mandatory goal that universities and employers must pursue and 
that racial preferences thwart. Universities can, for example, 
accept some reduction in academic quality in order to have 
winning sports teams (athletic preferences) or loyal alumni 
(legacy preferences). Nor must employers pursue efficiency at 
the expense of other goals. Therefore, even if racial preferences 
disserve one goal of universities or of employers, they may still 
serve other legitimate goals. And if racial preferences serve 
legitimate goals, then those who are dispreferred by their use 
have no rights that are thereby violated. Hence racial 
preferences are morally permissible. 
One problem with this argument is that the civil rights 
movement had as its target a racial preference system—one that 
favored whites over blacks. If that system was morally 
illegitimate, why is a racial preference system favoring other 
groups any better? 
Boonin attempts to deal with this objection (pp. 191–94), 
but he dismisses it much too quickly. He denies that current 
racial preference systems are ill-motivated, unlike those of the 
Jim Crow past (p. 193); and he denies that those victimized by 
present racial preferences are in the same circumstances as 
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blacks victimized by preferences for whites (p. 194). The latter 
point leads naturally to the topic of reparations, which we will 
address in the next section. So we put it aside and deal solely 
with the motivational point—that is, that racial preferences 
today are well-motivated. 
Let us assume that increasing “diversity,” providing role 
models, and the other non-reparative rationales offered by 
defenders of racial preferences are sincere and morally 
permissible. These rationales would also support preferences for 
whites whenever whites were underrepresented and in need of 
role models (NBA basketball?), as Boonin concedes (p. 194). 
But if diversity in the student body or workforce is some-
times a good thing, might homogeneity also sometimes be a 
good thing? (“I hire only white workers here because white 
workers are more comfortable around other white workers, and 
much less afraid of inadvertently causing offense.”) If so, would 
a “whites only” policy be morally permissible if motivated, not 
by ill will or racial hostility, but by the (perhaps plausible) 
benefits of homogeneity? The 1964 Civil Rights Act would 
surely forbid such a policy, but the policy could be morally 
permissible even if illegal. 
Boonin points out, correctly, that there is nothing 
objectionable about preferring a black for, say, the role of 
Othello or for going undercover to infiltrate a black criminal 
gang (pp. 181–84). By the same token, he presumably would not 
object to preferring whites to play Simon Legree or to infiltrate 
the Klan. The implications of Boonin’s argument go beyond 
these cases, however, where one’s (apparent) race makes one 
either suitable or unsuitable for the job at hand. Given what 
Boonin says about affirmative action in universities, he would 
have to concede the moral permissibility of racial preferences 
that disserve any legitimate goal so long as they serve another. 
Thus, if the military believed too few whites were going into the 
armed forces because of, say, the absence of sufficient role 
models, Boonin would have to conclude that the military would 
be justified in preferring white applicants to otherwise better 
qualified black ones. 
In a world that did not have our racial history, Boonin’s 
argument might be both correct and unremarkable. Race, 
however difficult to define, may in some instances be a good 
proxy for traits that serve legitimate secondary and tertiary goals 
of institutions. It may even sometimes be a good proxy for traits 
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that serve the institution’s primary goals. But is race a good 
proxy here and now, given our racial history? 
We agreed with Boonin that race might be sometimes be 
used to profile suspected criminals. For what hangs in the 
balance for those who are profiled but are innocent is the 
inconvenience, irritation, and potential embarrassment or 
humiliation of a temporary interrogation, for which we 
suggested they should perhaps be compensated. When it comes 
to denials of jobs or admission to universities, however, the 
stakes are much higher, compensation is out of the question,11 
and the role that race plays is more overt and corrosive. 
Affirmative action preferences have become institu-
tionalized in various settings, but perhaps in none so 
extensively—and so much as a matter of institutional credo—as 
in higher education. Boonin’s defense of affirmative action is 
consequentialist and moral. If a policy is harmful on balance, 
therefore, its moral standing is compromised if not refuted, 
especially if those engaged in affirmative action are public 
institutions using taxpayers’ dollars. Taking higher education as 
a prominent example, then, and considering affirmative action as 
it is actually carried out at American colleges and universities, it 
seems to us that the consequentialist scorecard is considerably 
less encouraging than Boonin suggests.12 
What are the benefits and costs of affirmative action? Some 
students who are admitted (and some faculty members who are 
hired) on an affirmative action basis are surely benefitted: in the 
case of students, young people who would not have attended an 
elite university but for racial preference, yet having been 
admitted, go on to achieve success in school and beyond. There 
is evidence, however, that many students who are “beneficiaries” 
of affirmative action suffer significantly—both educationally and 
in other ways—from institutional mismatch: having been 
admitted with notably lesser qualifications than other students, 
they do less well, not only than their better qualified classmates, 
but then they themselves would do on a campus where their 
qualifications were nearer the mean. In disproportionate 
numbers, they fail to graduate or to qualify professionally. They 
 
 11. What would “compensate” one who is denied admission to the school of his or 
her choice because of race? Perhaps the monetary equivalent of the lost value, or 
admission to an equally good school. But these are not feasible nor available. 
 12. The consequentialist criterion is in counterpoise to the thought, sometimes 
attributed to the late Prime Minister Garrett FitzGerald of Ireland, that “That’s all right 
in practice, but will it work in theory?” 
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also gravitate away from rigorous courses of study, scientific and 
otherwise, which they might pursue successfully at institutions 
where their qualifications were not compromised.13 As a further 
counterweight to the benefit that preferences might provide to 
those preferred: there would, of course, be other students and 
faculty who would have been admitted and hired and thus 
benefitted, but for the preferences. To this extent, the benefits 
for those preferred are offset by the benefits forgone by others 
as a result of affirmative action. 
Advocates of preferences cite racial diversity as an 
academic benefit to all students—not just to those preferred—
and to the educational enterprise as a whole. Suffice it to say 
that we think the academic benefits of racial preferences are 
speculative at best. Intellectual diversity on a faculty is a good 
thing, we believe, and it is probably a good thing in a student 
body. It is conceivable that geographic diversity, too, or diversity 
of parents’ occupations might marginally contribute to students’ 
knowledge in a valuable way (as compared to a student body 
admitted more nearly on the academic merits); but the benefit, if 
any, is uncertain. The idea of geographic diversity was originally 
developed at elite universities to limit the number of Jewish 
students: its “intellectual” justification was a fig leaf. It seems to 
us that race, likewise, is a poor proxy for promoting genuine 
intellectual diversity or for ascertaining whether a given 
student’s admission will benefit other students or the academic 
goals of a college or university. 
Racial preferences in higher education are said to produce 
broader social benefits as well. They are said to provide role 
models for minority young people, to provide highly-trained 
graduates who will serve under-served minority communities, 
and to foster greater inter-racial understanding and cooperation. 
We accept that if racial preferences generate these effects, then 
to that extent their consequences are positive. The evidence that 
they do so is at best uncertain, however. The importance of role 
models of a particular race or ethnicity, and the numbers that are 
desirable as such, are speculative and controversial. Likewise for 
whether and to what extent minority communities benefit from 
the services of those admitted preferentially. And certainly 
likewise for whether preferences foster inter-racial under-
standing and cooperation, or rather the reverse. 
 
 13. See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American 
Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004). 
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In considering benefits and costs, of course, even if racial 
preferences in academic admissions and faculty hiring have some 
positive effects, these must be weighed against the negative 
effects. It seems to us that the negative consequences are much 
clearer than the positive ones. 
The most obvious negative consequence is that the most 
academically qualified student body and faculty are forgone. 
That is surely a social cost, although it is difficult to quantify its 
magnitude. It is not, however, the only social cost of racial 
preferences. 
One further cost is the perpetuation of racial consciousness. 
Humans are one inter-breeding species, the division of which 
into races is, from a biological point of view, quite arbitrary. The 
civil rights movement in the era of its major triumphs marched 
on the principle that race, both biologically and sociologically, 
was a shallow and irrelevant distinction, and that, in Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s words, we should be judged by the content of 
our character, not the color of our skin. The Civil Rights Act of 
1964 embodied the principle that race should be abandoned as a 
criterion upon which individuals’ fortunes turned. Racial 
preferences teach a different lesson. One’s race is important. It 
can get one into a school or on its faculty, or it can stand in one’s 
way in these respects. Race is not an arbitrary, superficial, and 
irrelevant characteristic within a common humanity. Rather, 
race to some considerable extent is destiny.14 
The negative effects of this on campuses are plain to see. 
Students admitted because of their race, who are less qualified 
academically, tend not to integrate but to segregate. That is an 
understandable defense mechanism, but it works against the 
“promotion of understanding” diversity rationale. 
Another negative consequence of racial preferences—both 
in student admissions and in faculty hiring—is the creation of 
ghettoized academic departments: what are sometimes called 
“grievance studies” departments. These departments tend not to 
be rigorous and disinterested but rather to be polemical, 
partisan, and grievance generating. They disproportionately 
attract preferentially admitted students, as a kind of safe haven. 
 
 14. Universities must now dust off the racial codes of the old South, of South 
Africa, or of Nazi Germany in order to have at hand formal definitions of “races” to 
make sure that the wrong people don’t claim racial preferences. And given the 
arbitrariness of racial definitions, they will not be able to escape the charge of 
arbitrariness in employing those definitions, let alone the obnoxiousness of doing so. 
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These departments, their faculty and their students, tend to be 
among the more ardent advocates of the hate speech codes and 
of the norms of political correctness that Boonin dislikes: not so 
much to defend against wounding and silencing as to stifle the 
speech of those who might oppose affirmative action or who 
might dare to point out that admission standards have been 
lowered. 
Moreover, because no one likes to be admitted under 
“lowered” standards, affirmative action tends to have two 
additional negative consequences. The first is the debasement of 
honest dialogue: students or faculty members are not “less 
qualified” but rather are “differently qualified.” Second, and 
relatedly, the fear of being considered less qualified generates 
attacks on the academic norms by which qualifications are 
gauged. Legitimate norms are claimed to be no better at 
determining academic mettle than “different”—racially or 
ideologically freighted—norms. 
The extent of these negative effects of affirmative action is 
obviously controversial. We write about them as long-time 
denizens of universities, without illusions about proving them 
conclusively to the satisfaction of everyone. But neither have the 
claimed beneficial effects of affirmative action been proved. We 
think the negative effects we have cited are more probable than 
the positive ones. In any event, we do not believe the morality of 
affirmative action can be determined without considering these 
effects. Boonin is correct that dispreferred students have no 
moral “right” that institutions should serve goals for which they 
happen to be qualified. And he is correct that institutions such as 
universities may morally permissibly serve a plurality of goals. 
But these considerations do not show that morality is indifferent 
to the consequences of the pursuit of those goals. It seems to us 
that Boonin fails to confront the negative consequences of racial 
preferences which he claims to be morally permissible. 
Racial preferences, in reality, were first adopted and 
justified as a form of reparations. The constitutionality of that 
justification was undermined by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bakke,15 and only then did “diversity” become the 
new and constitutionally more defensible rationale. We believe, 
however, that diversity has always been a legal fig leaf, and that 
the reparative goal is what has always motivated the use of racial 
 
 15. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (denying the constitu-
tionality of the use of racial preferences by a University of California medical school).  
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preferences. So it is to Boonin’s treatment of reparations that we 
now turn. 
V. REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY 
Boonin’s chapters on reparations for slavery are the first 
two substantive chapters of the book, and they are by far the 
longest. Boonin claims that he was at one time persuaded by 
David Horowitz’s critique of the case for reparations16 but then, 
upon careful if not agonizing reappraisal, came to the opposite 
conclusion, namely that the case for reparations was compelling. 
He does not address the form reparations should take, but he 
does believe reparations in some form are owed to blacks 
Americans. 
Boonin’s argument for reparations consists of five steps. 
Here is how Boonin describes them and the conclusions they 
justify. 
Step one—the compensation principle: if a government 
wrongfully harms someone as a result of the authorized 
actions of some of its public officials, then it incurs a moral 
obligation to compensate its victim for the harms that it has 
wrongfully caused. 
Step two—the historical claim: in the past, the U.S. 
government wrongfully harmed previous generations of 
Africans and African Americans by supporting the institution 
of slavery and subsequent forms of legalized segregation and 
discrimination. 
Step three—the causal claim: the acts by which the U.S. 
government wrongfully harmed previous generations of 
Africans and African Americans by supporting the institution 
of slavery and subsequent forms of legalized segregation and 
discrimination in the past continue to cause harmful 
consequences for the currently living generation of black 
Americans today. 
Step four—the surviving public obligation principle: if a 
government incurs a moral obligation as a result of the 
authorized actions of some of its public officials then this 
obligation doesn’t cease to exist when the officials in question 
die. 
Step five—the unpaid balance claim: the U.S. government has 
 
 16. See DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER 
REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY (Encounter Books, 2002). 
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not yet fully compensated the currently living generation of 
black Americans for the harmful consequences they continue 
to incur as a result of slavery and its aftermath. 
It seems to me that all five of these steps must be accepted, 
and on grounds that opponents of slave reparations them-
selves already accept. It also seems to me that if all five of 
these steps must be accepted, then the reparations position 
itself must be accepted: the first two steps justify an obligation 
on the part of the past government to past black Americans, 
the third justifies extending the obligation from one owed to 
past black Americans to one owed to present black 
Americans, the fourth justifies extending the obligation from 
one owed by the past government to one owed by the present 
government, and the fifth justifies the conclusion that the 
present government’s obligation has not yet been fully 
discharged. Since each of the steps taken individually seem to 
be justified, and since all of the steps taken together seem to 
justify the conclusion, the conclusion itself seems to be 
justified: the U.S. government does indeed have a moral 
obligation to benefit the currently living generation of black 
Americans because of the wrongful harms that were inflicted 
on past generations of Africans and African Americans by the 
institution of slavery and its aftermath (pp. 53–54). 
Very fairly, Boonin quotes at some length from David 
Horowitz’s ten-point case against reparations. Among 
Horowitz’s points are (Point 1) there is no single group 
responsible for the crime of slavery (from whom reparation 
should be sought); (Point 3) only a minority of white Americans 
owned slaves, while others gave their lives to free them; (Point 
6) the reparations argument is based on the unsubstantiated 
claim that all African Americans suffer from the economic 
consequences of slavery and discrimination; (Point 7) the 
reparations claim sends a damaging message to the African 
American community of victimhood and alienation; and (Point 
9) slavery, which traditionally existed in all societies, was 
brought to an end largely at the initiative of the Anglo-American 
anti-slavery movement, and would not have ended in America 
when it did, were it not for the sacrifices of American soldiers 
and an American President who gave his life to sign the 
Emancipation Proclamation. 
Boonin rejects all of Horowitz’s points summarily—too 
summarily, we think. It seems to us that Boonin underestimates 
some of the difficulties implicit in his own argument; and more 
broadly, that there are questions of practical wisdom which he 
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fails to consider, and which militate against the idea of racial 
reparations today. 
Boonin stipulates (Step Two of his argument) that the U.S. 
government harmed previous generations of African Americans 
by supporting slavery and post-slavery discrimination. But 
slavery was lawful in the British colonies in America prior to 
American Independence, and in other British colonies for some 
years thereafter. It was lawful in the newly independent 
American states under the Articles of Confederation, when the 
states were virtually sovereign countries. It remained lawful 
under the laws of some states after the ratification of the 
Constitution. As is generally recognized, there probably would 
not have been a United States had the Constitution attempted to 
disestablish slavery in the states. 
Boonin has two responses to this point. The first is to argue 
that the non-slave states could have adopted a Constitution and 
created a smaller country, one without the slave states in it. In 
this way, the United States could have avoided wronging the 
slaves. But had it done so, essentially washing its hands of the 
problem of slavery, slavery might have persisted in the southern 
states long after it was in fact eliminated. 
Boonin’s second response is to distinguish wrongness from 
culpability. Even if the Framers were not culpable for not 
abolishing slavery—because they could not have done so—their 
failing to do so was nonetheless a wrong.17 An alternate view, 
however, is that “ought must imply can.” If the United States 
could not have abolished slavery at the outset without being 
stillborn as a country, but later—when the loyalties built up by 
the nation and the “mystic chords of memory” made it 
possible—incurred civil war and the loss of hundreds of 
thousands of its citizens’ lives in order to abolish it, then the 
initial acquiescence in slavery can plausibly be said not only not 
to have been culpable (as Boonin concedes) but also not wrong, 
at least not in the sense of a wrong that calls for further 
reparations centuries later.18 
 
 17. Boonin seems to suggest that the government’s acquiescing in wrongs that it 
cannot prevent is itself a wrong. But to state such a position is to see its absurdity. The 
government of the United States today “acquiesces”—by declining to intervene—in 
countless horrible brutalities around the globe, brutalities that it cannot eradicate, if at 
all, without sacrificing considerable blood and treasure. Such acquiescence cannot 
plausibly count as a wrong. Or if it is, then all of us are guilty of countless such “wrongs,” 
and the charge that we are loses all sting. 
 18. Boonin does not discuss the wrongs of the slave states and their potential 
obligations with respect to reparations. Given the mobility of the black population over 
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Boonin’s Step Three, the causal claim, is problematic as 
well. Boonin’s argument is that the only explanation for why 
black Americans on average are faring worse than other 
Americans on average must be because of the past wrongs of 
slavery, Jim Crow, and discrimination. 
The emphasis on a group’s lower-than-average welfare, of 
course, deflects attention from the members of the group who 
are not worse off than the national average: in the case of black 
Americans, a significant African-American middle and upper 
middle class. On a “causality” argument, it is not clear why 
people in this category are owed reparations. Moreover, even 
the lower-than-average welfare of a group as a whole might not 
be so easily attributable to any single cause or set of causes. 
Over the course of a century and a half since the abolition of 
slavery, a great many intervening causes have had time to 
develop. Moreover, groups—however defined—do not have the 
same average outcomes in life, even in the absence of invidious 
discrimination. Almost any group is likely to be either above or 
below average: whether the group is defined by race, ethnicity, 
religion, or virtually any other criterion. 
Boonin suggests that reparations need not consist of 
payments to individual black Americans. Rather, Boonin 
proposes that reparations can consist of payments to 
organizations and schools that are “predominately black” (p. 
126). He points out that Germany’s form of reparations for the 
Holocaust has been to give money to the State of Israel, even 
though not everyone who benefits is Jewish and not every Jew is 
benefitted. Boonin believes this provides a model for reparations 
for slavery, even though black Americans have no “state” or 
corporate form. 
 
time and the migration of many blacks to the North and West, the reparations arguments 
would be enormously more complex at the state level than at the federal level. In any 
event, because Boonin does not consider state liability, neither shall we. 
Could Boonin have built his case for reparations by the U.S. government on Jim 
Crow rather than on slavery? Could he have argued, in effect, that although the U.S. 
government could not have ended slavery until the Civil War, it could have or prevented 
the enactment of Jim Crow laws immediately thereafter? One question is whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment did outlaw Jim Crow laws, and the Supreme Court mistakenly 
held otherwise in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the racial 
segregation, by law, of railroad cars in Louisiana). (What is the responsibility of the U.S. 
government for an erroneous constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court?) If the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not outlaw Jim Crow, could it have been ratified had it done 
so? If it could not been ratified, is the U.S. government nonetheless responsible for the 
racial harms of the Jim Crow era? Again, because Boonin does not take up these 
questions, neither shall we. 
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There are further causation problems, however. One is that 
but for the wrongful policies of the past, many or most black 
people the United States today would not exist, because those 
wrongs affected who had children with whom, and when. Had 
slavery ended when the United States began, there undoubtedly 
would be black people living in America today; and if Boonin is 
correct, they would, as a group, be better off than black 
Americans, as a group, are today. But these black Americans 
would be different individuals from those who are today’s black 
Americans. The latter would not exist but for the past wrongs 
such as slavery. 
A lot of philosophical ink has been spilt on this general 
topic. How can future generations be wronged by policies that 
affect their identity, and but for which they would not exist? 
Boonin argues that most people—even those inclined to 
oppose reparations—would support compensation to those 
blinded by wrongful pollution, even if the people in question 
would not have come into existence but for the pollution (pp. 
109–10). Hence, the “non-identity” problem should not be a 
barrier to compensation for wrongs. 
Yet Boonin rightly senses that to make the case for 
reparations air tight, which is his ambition, he cannot so easily 
dismiss the non-identity problem. Therefore, Boonin goes on to 
present another case that he believes is a convincing one for 
compensation even in the face of the non-identity problem. In 
this case a child, Charlie, is born blind because of the effects of 
pollution on his parents. Moreover, the pollution affected the 
time of his conception, so that in its absence, a different child 
would have been conceived. Charlie would not have existed but 
for the wrongful pollution; therefore, his blindness cannot be a 
worsening of his condition. Charlie’s blindness would be 
reversible, however, but for the lingering effects of the pollution, 
which impede recovery. In such a case, Boonin argues, the 
polluter would owe Charlie compensation, not for his being born 
blind, but rather for his continued blindness due to the lingering 
toxic effects of the pollution. And likewise, black Americans can 
be owed reparations for the harmful lingering effects of past 
wrongs even if the very existence of the people in question is a 
product of those wrongs (pp. 110–11). 
We think the non-identity problem might not be refuted so 
easily. Boonin assumes Charlie in his example would definitely 
have a valid moral claim based on the present effects of the 
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pollution that led to his very existence. If the pollution and its 
after-effects are a package deal—with one you get the other—
then the after-effects are as much a condition of Charlie’s 
existence as the initial pollution. Boonin admits that if Charlie’s 
blindness were irreversible, the non-identity problem would 
stand in the way of his claim that the pollution was a wrong to 
him. Why, then, is he wronged by its after-effects, even if in their 
absence his blindness could have been cured? 
The point can be made another way. Suppose a demon 
offers you life with irreversible blindness from birth. That is the 
only way he’ll grant you life. If your life would still be worth 
living, you’ll take the deal. 
Now suppose the demon changes the deal to this extent. 
He’ll offer you life with otherwise reversible blindness that he 
will prevent being reversed. You are no worse off under this deal 
than you were under the previous one, so you’ll take it. And if, 
after having been born blind, you are prevented by the demon 
from curing it, you cannot claim the demon is wronging you. A 
deal is a deal, and you, not the demon, are the one attempting to 
renege. 
Others have attempted to get around the non-identity 
problem in the context of reparations by basing reparations on 
wrongs to the slaves themselves, not their descendants. The 
argument is that the slaves would have wanted what was owed 
them in compensation to go to their descendants whoever they 
might be. Perhaps this is a better theory, and a more tenable 
argument for reparations. But it is not the theory that Boonin 
adopts. Boonin’s theory founders on the non-identity problem: 
his Step Three, and with it his case for reparations, fails. 
Some might argue that in addition to the non-identity 
problem, there is another problem with Boonin’s Step Three 
causal claim. It concerns the way that the past wrongs of slavery 
and Jim Crow are presently causing many blacks to fare poorly. 
Boonin thinks that it plausible that America’s past racial 
wrongs cause present harms to black Americans by having 
spawned an underclass subculture that is dysfunctional in the 
modern social and economic environment. He cites works by 
John McWhorter and Shelby Steele which describe that culture 
and how it probably arose.19 The dysfunctional aspects of that 
 
 19. See JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK 
AMERICA (2001); SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED: THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF 
BLACK FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1998). 
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subculture are well known: high illegitimacy rates; anti-
intellectualism (deprecating “acting White”); and high crime 
rates, with high levels of violence. We think this subculture’s 
contribution to social and economic problems in the black 
community is more than plausible.20 Indeed, Boonin implies that 
he might agree. 
Boonin believes that slavery and Jim Crow contributed to 
the creation of this troubled subculture. We shall assume Boonin 
is correct on this point, though there is some reason to be 
skeptical. The spread of the “oppositional” culture of the late 
1960s and early 1970s surely played a big role, as have other 
more recent changes in the general culture, some of which may 
be the unintended effects of the Great Society welfare programs 
and their successors; for the differences between black and white 
Americans with respect to family, education, and crime were 
considerably smaller in the 1950s than they are today. 
Even if Boonin is correct about the causal antecedents of 
the underclass subculture, those making the argument we are 
considering would object to Boonin’s conclusion that the past 
wrongs are responsible for the individual choices that constitute 
and perpetuate that culture. They would point to the law’s 
treatment of voluntary acts. Such acts are generally (though not 
universally) held to be “intervening, superseding causes” that 
“break the causal chains” that otherwise link the results of those 
acts with the acts’ causal antecedents.21 They would point to the 
law’s refusal to recognize so-called “cultural defenses,” whether 
for Muslim honor killings or for the crimes of gangbangers. 
Moreover, they might argue, the law is correct in doing this, for 
it dignifies people by not viewing them as helpless captives of 
their cultural mores. They are not “blaming the victim” but 
dignifying people who make moral (or immoral) choices. 
 
 20.  We should not be taken to be denying that there are many attractive features 
of so-called “black culture.” What we are claiming is that certain aspects of that culture—
the aspects that are in direct opposition to traditional middle-class values—and the 
multitude of individual choices that constitute and perpetuate those aspects of black 
culture, produce a lower than average income, a poorer than average academic 
performance, and a higher than average crime rate. Neither do we deny that these 
aspects of the culture may even have been adaptive and functional during the slavery and 
Jim Crow eras; nevertheless, they are highly maladaptive and dysfunctional today. 
 21. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 195 (6th ed. 2012). 
Michael Moore rejects the idea that causal chains are “broken” by voluntary choices, but 
he does believe those intervening choices attenuate the causal responsibility of acts 
antecedent to those choices. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 
249–323 (2009). 
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This second argument against Step Three, however, is one 
that we believe is too strong. The law’s treatment of cultural 
causation may be correct for the law’s purposes, but it is too 
stark and one-sided to rebut Boonin’s causal claim. It may be 
possible to choose in opposition to the norms of one’s 
community, but it will often be so difficult that responsibility for 
choosing in accord with those norms is surely diminished if not 
totally extinguished. Moreover, because community norms are 
usually implanted in childhood, when the information, critical 
skills, and motivational strength necessary to reject them is 
absent, it is unduly harsh to regard the later choices that 
constitute and perpetuate those norms as fully voluntary and 
responsible. We conclude that Boonin’s Step Three fails because 
of the non-identity problem, but not because of the law’s notion 
of intervening, superseding causes. 
Despite the failure of Boonin’s Step Three, his causal step, 
many will agree with him that not only were slavery and post-
emancipation Jim Crow laws great evils, but also that they ought 
to be but have not been atoned, and that reparations are owed. 
So let us look then briefly at Boonin’s Step Five, his unpaid 
balance claim. 
It seems to us Boonin is facile in rejecting the idea that 
American society has already gone a great distance in making 
reparation. The Civil War itself meant, in Lincoln’s words, that 
America would pay for “every drop of blood drawn with the 
lash” with “another drawn by the sword”. Since the mid-
twentieth century, America not only enacted comprehensive 
laws outlawing racial discrimination, it also adopted wide-
ranging social policies whose goals and raisons d’etre clearly 
amounted to reparation. These include social welfare programs 
that black Americans would be disproportionately eligible for—
programs openly motivated at least in large part by bad 
conscience about past racial injustice—as well as the growth of 
affirmative action in virtually all the important institutions of 
American life. The reparations have been spiritual as well as 
material: the adoption of Martin Luther King, Jr. as a national 
hero, and the emphasis in many school curricula on Civil Rights 
history, sometimes virtually to the exclusion of other aspects of 
American history. Boonin’s suggestion that social welfare 
programs adopted in the Civil Rights era cannot be regarded as 
reparations because black Americans were not the exclusive 
beneficiaries is unconvincing: as though German reparations to 
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Jewish victims would not “count” if the reparations were offered 
to Roma or to other victims as well. 
Boonin’s other rejoinder to David Horowitz and others who 
maintain that reparations have already in effect been made is 
that whatever has been done is not enough because it has not 
succeeded: the welfare of black Americans, on average, is still 
less than that of white Americans on average. But this thought is 
double edged. As we suggested, and as Boonin acknowledges, 
various observers consider that many of the social programs that 
gathered momentum in the 1960s, including welfare programs 
and affirmative action, tended to aggravate rather than to 
mitigate the condition of many black Americans: by fostering 
family collapse, dependency, alienation, and disassimilation. We 
incline to that view ourselves, although Boonin presumably does 
not. Boonin’s conclusion is that more reparations are necessary. 
But in practice, further programs in the name of reparations 
would almost certainly resemble the redistributive and 
preferential programs which may have done, as Boonin 
grudgingly acknowledges—or which did in fact, as we believe—
more harm than good. In short, the case for reparations seems to 
be that the late-twentieth century remedies made things worse, 
so let us have more of them. 
Boonin’s case for reparations takes little account of such 
questions of phronesis or practical wisdom. Reparations can be a 
destructive remedy, especially inasmuch as they might reinforce 
the sense of victimhood, grievance, and alienation which have 
been fostered—in many cases surely with the best of 
intentions—by public policy and by broader cultural forces over 
the past half century. This was an era in which the Civil Rights 
revolution did away with pervasive racial discrimination and 
segregation; and in which many black Americans, probably a 
majority, became members of the broad American middle class. 
But it was also an era of growing social dysfunction among other 
parts of the black community: greatly increased rates of 
illegitimacy, family breakdown, educational failure, drugs, and 
violence. 
Amy Wax has written eloquently about how those who have 
been injured by wrongdoing must themselves take painful 
measures in order to recover, measures that cannot be 
undertaken by the wrongdoers no matter how willing.22 A person 
 
 22. AMY L. WAX, RACE, WRONGS, AND REMEDIES: GROUP JUSTICE IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2009). 
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injured in an auto accident that was the fault of the other driver 
can have his lost income and the cost of his medical treatments 
compensated by the wrongdoer. At some point, however, he will 
have to undergo painful rehabilitative measures in order to 
recover fully. The wrongdoer cannot undergo those measures for 
him. The victim can perhaps be compensated for the pain he 
must endure to recover, but he cannot avoid the pain itself and 
hope to recover. 
Racial reparations, at this historical juncture, might actually 
worsen the condition of those for whom they are meant to be 
reparative: for they will not eradicate the dysfunctional culture 
but are liable to reinforce it. The best reparations might instead 
be a sober effort to alter that culture. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We admire Boonin’s effort to take an open-minded tone 
about these controversial racial topics and especially his 
willingness to consider arguments that might be thought 
“politically incorrect.” Although we have disagreed with Boonin 
on various points, we think this book is both provocative and 
serious. We give one and one-half cheers for Should Race 
Matter? 
 
